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Re-imagining DDR
Ex-combatants, leadership and moral agency in
conflict transformation
KIERAN MCEVOY AND PETER SHIRLOW
Queen’s University Belfast, UK
Abstract
Drawing upon criminological studies in the field of prisoner
rehabilitation, this essay explores the relevance of the
Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) framework
to the process of conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. In a
similar fashion to the critique of ‘passivity’ offered by, for
example, the ‘strengths based’ or ‘good lives’ approach to
prisoner resettlement and reintegration more generally, the
authors contend that the Northern Ireland peace process offers
conspicuous examples of former prisoners and combatants as
agents and indeed leaders in the process of conflict
transformation. They draw out three broad styles of leadership
which have emerged amongst ex-combatants over the course of
the Northern Ireland transition from conflict—political, military
and communal. They suggest that cumulatively such leadership
speaks to the potential of ex-prisoners and ex-combatants as
moral agents in conflict transformation around which
peacemaking can be constructed rather than as obstacles which
must be ‘managed’ out of existence.
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Introduction and background
The image of Sinn Féin’s deputy leader Martin McGuinness and the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) leader Ian Paisley sharing power in
Northern Ireland has been rightly lauded as an example par excellence of
successful conflict transformation (Hain, 2007). While the process has been
characterised by tortuously slow progress and numerous seemingly insur-
mountable impasses (ultimately overcome) since the Good Friday
Agreement was signed in 1998 (Aughey, 2005; Bew, 2007), the broader tra-
jectory towards peace has been sustained. This paper explores the role that
politically motivated ex-prisoners1 and ex-combatants have played in main-
taining that momentum, particularly ‘on the ground’ in communities most
affected by violence (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006).
The essay begins with an exploration of the out-workings in Northern
Ireland of the framework most often applied to ex-combatants and released
politically motivated prisoners in former conflict zones, i.e. Disarmament,
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). Then, drawing from recent crim-
inological scholarship on different variants of reintegration in particular
(discussed elsewhere in this issue), the essay develops a critique of the pas-
sivity which permeates much of the writings and practice of DDR. It suggests
instead three overlapping leadership styles which (it is argued) are discern-
able amongst former prisoners and ex-combatants in Northern Ireland. Each
of these speaks directly to the question of moral agency in conflict transfor-
mation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the
Northern Ireland experience to peacemaking efforts elsewhere, both in other
transitional societies and indeed in other more ‘settled’ contexts.
Before examining some of these broader questions, it might be useful at
this juncture to offer some background to the research in this article in par-
ticular and to the reintegration of former prisoners and ex-combatants
more generally in Northern Ireland.
First, with regard to this essay, it merges individual and collaborative
work with, and research on, serving and former politically motivated pris-
oners and ex-combatants conducted over the past two decades in Northern
Ireland (see e.g. Gormally et al., 1993; McEvoy, 2001; Shirlow, 2001;
Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008). Most recently the authors completed a major
study of 300 former Republican and Loyalist prisoners and 150 family
members (75 from each community) based in North and West Belfast.
Facilitated by Republican and Loyalist ex-prisoner organisations (Coiste na
n-Iarchimí and EPIC respectively), that research involved surveying the for-
mer prisoners and their families, as well as a series of workshops, focus
groups and a range of semi-structured interviews (see Shirlow and McEvoy,
2008 for further discussion). The fieldwork referred to in this essay is
drawn from that most recent study.
With regard to the experience of former politically motivated prisoners
more generally in Northern Ireland, under the terms of the 1998 Agreement,
all qualifying paramilitary prisoners belonging to organisations on ceasefire
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were to be released from prison within two years (McEvoy, 2001). Although,
the numbers released under these provisions constituted only a small per-
centage of those who were imprisoned as a result of the conflict, these releases
have remained amongst the most controversial aspects of the peace process
(Digney, 2007). To date, 450 prisoners have been released early (196 Loyalist,
242 Republican and 12 non-aligned) under those provisions.2
Despite the dire predictions from some quarters at the time, in pure recidi-
vism terms, the early releases have been a striking success. To date, only 20
persons have been returned to prison for breaching the terms of their licences.
Of these 16 were life sentence prisoners and four were determinate sentence
prisoners. Ten of the 20 (four determinates and six lifers) were returned for
alleged involvement in terrorist offending behaviour and 10 for alleged
involvement in non-terrorist offending behaviour.3 A total of 28 prisoners
have been reconvicted of other offences, although the Northern Ireland
prison service does not specify how many of these overlap with licence revo-
cations. In any case, an approximate figure of probably less than 40 prison-
ers (or less than 10 per cent) being involved in either ordinary or politically
motivated offending a decade after the early releases commenced is quite
striking.4 By way of comparison, the recidivism rate in Britain for ‘ordinary’
offenders released from prison is that 58 per cent are reconvicted of another
offence within two years (Home Office, 2001). In Northern Ireland, the
equivalent figure is 48 per cent (NIPS, 2003). In short, the recidivism rates
speak directly to the political motivation of the vast majority of the inmates.
Those who benefited from the early releases re-entered communities into
which approximately 15,000 Republicans and somewhere between 5,000–
10,000 Loyalists had already been released throughout the conflict. As well
as the provisions relating to the early released the Agreement also stated
that:
The Governments continue to recognise the importance of measures to facili-
tate the reintegration of prisoners into the community by providing support
both prior to and after release, including assistance directed towards availing of
employment opportunities, re-training and/or re-skilling, and further education.
(Belfast Agreement, 1998: 26)
Despite this reference to its importance in the Agreement, the practice of
prisoner reintegration in Northern Ireland remained controversial. For
some, the allocation of any resources towards those who had been involved
in violence constituted a ‘reward to the “men of violence”’ (Gormally,
2001). For others, the process has been characterised by a lack of political
will on the part of government to properly support the work of ex-prison-
ers and to remove the obstacles faced by them in reconstructing their post-
conflict lives (Rolston, 2007). In addition, many politically motivated
ex-prisoners themselves bridle at the term ‘reintegration’, suggesting that it
undermines their ‘hard earned’ status as political rather than ordinary
offenders; that it denotes a failure to acknowledge the structural causes of
violence and their continued exclusion from full citizenship entitlements;
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and that it implies a basic misunderstanding of the relationship between
them and the communities from which they come—implying that they are
somehow ‘other’ or apart from such communities or are required to change
in order to ‘fit back’ into society (Coiste, 2003a, 2003b).
Between 1995 and 2003, 61 former prisoner groups and a further 29
affiliated projects received a total of £9.2 million in funding from the
Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI)5 and the European
Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace I and II) in
Northern Ireland. While this was undoubtedly a significant investment of
resources, it represented less than 1 per cent of the total EU and government
funded budget for peace and reconciliation work in Northern Ireland
(Shirlow et al., 2005). The reintegrative model developed for ex-prisoners
was essentially a self-help model. Monies were distributed through CFNI
(a highly respected independent community funding agency) which estab-
lished an advisory committee made up of all the main prisoner groupings as
well professional agencies such as the Northern Ireland Association for the
Care and Resettlement of Offenders (NIACRO), the Quakers and the Irish
Commission for Prisoners Overseas (ICPO)—all of which had a history of
working on prisoner issues. The actual management and staffing of the
reintegration programmes was left largely to the ex-prisoners themselves.6
The projects were organised on a factional basis, broadly mirroring the var-
ious paramilitary organisations to which they had previously belonged.
Thus Coiste na n-Iarchimí became the umbrella organisation for former
IRA prisoners, EPIC serviced former UVF and RHC prisoners, Prisoners
Aid acted for UDA/UFF, Teach na Failte for former INLA prisoners, and a
range of programmes catered for different smaller and non-aligned groups
(Gormally, 2001). While undoubtedly this model resulted in some duplica-
tion of effort, it is difficult to see how any other method would have been
feasible with these former sworn enemies in the early days of the transition.
As for the practical work of the projects, this has encompassed a broad
spectrum of activities, only a snapshot of which can be discussed here. The
range of work in which politically motivated former prisoners are or have
been involved includes: direct service such as counselling and training for
ex-prisoners and their families; capacity building in local communities;
ex-prisoner self-help initiatives including conflict related tourist pro-
grammes delivered by former combatants; community based anti-poverty
and anti-racist work; resolving disputes at interface areas and concerning
contested marches; community based restorative justice as alternatives to
punishment violence; youth diversionary work; initiatives on dealing with
the past including truth recovery, developing relations with former enemies
and victims of violence and devising forms of memorialisation and com-
memoration; equality and human rights campaigning, and a host of other
related activities (see McEvoy and Mika, 2002; Shirlow et al., 2005;
Gormally et al., 2007; Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008 for an overview).
This diverse range of activities reflects the particular variant of prisoner rein-
tegration which has developed in Northern Ireland. Such reintegrative projects
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have developed alongside efforts to deal with both the decommissioning of
weapons and the nature, structure and very existence of the paramilitary
organisations themselves. It is the intersection of these different dynamics to
which we now turn.
Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) and the
relevance of criminology
In the wider international context of political conflicts, DDR programmes
are now a familiar element of the post-conflict reconstruction template
(Kigma, 2001; Gear, 2002; Berdal, 2005). As Kofi Annan argued in the
Preface to the United Nations Integrated Demobilization, Disarmament and
Reintegration Standards, ‘the disarmament, demobilization and reintegra-
tion of former combatants and those associated with armed groups is a pre-
requisite for post-conflict stability and recovery’ (UNDKPO, 2006). Since
1991 the United Nations has assisted with DDR programmes in 18 different
countries. In addition, a number of other countries have instigated their own
national programmes without significant UN oversight.7 Often the rationale
for DDR programmes, particularly from major donors, appears to be a fix-
ation upon getting combatant groups disarmed, broken up and returned to
civilian life as smoothly as possible, lest they prove a destabilising factor in
efforts to move a society towards peace. As the World Bank detailed in its
rationale for demobilisation and reintegration in the Great Lakes Region of
Africa: ‘The strategy’s main premise is that the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of ex-combatants is necessary to establishing peace and
restoring security, which are in turn pre-conditions for sustainable growth
and poverty reduction’ (World Bank, 2002: iii).
One interesting feature for current purposes is the fact that so little
emphasis in the DDR literature refers to the particular needs and experi-
ences of released political prisoners. Rather the tendency is for DDR pro-
grammes to be shaped primarily around the needs of those combatants still
‘in the field’ (Marks, 2000). While perhaps understandable, given that these
are the individuals and groups with the most obvious military capacity, it
should be remembered that prisoners most often remain an important part
of their broader social or political movement. As a prominent Republican
former prisoner remarked to the authors, ‘the Maze for us was simply the
IRA locked up, we were still an integral part of the Army’s [IRA] structure’.
The failure of DDR programmes to acknowledge formally the particular
needs and, indeed, abilities of former prisoners (for example, as leaders in the
transition to peace) is a serious flaw. Further, as Rolston (2007) has argued,
the evidence would suggest that DDR works most effectively when it is a
staged element of more broadly focused genuine efforts to develop a society
socially, politically and economically (Baaré, 2001). Efforts to simply disarm
ex-combatants, get them out of military structures and back into a civilian life
as quickly as possible (while their social and political circumstances remain
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unchanged) is not generally a recipe for stability (Gear, 2002). The collapse
of the peace process in Liberia in 1999 is an example par excellence of the
dire consequences of a ‘quick and dirty approach to DDR’ where insignificant
efforts were made to follow through on the promises contained in the Abuja
Peace Accord (Gomes Porto et al., 2007). As a result, it is increasingly recog-
nised internationally that processes of DDR cannot be ‘ring-fenced’ as pri-
marily military or security matters but rather must be seen as an integral
element of broader post-conflict developmental work (Knight, 2008)
The version of DDR which has emerged in Northern Ireland has a num-
ber of distinctive features which are worth outlining briefly here by way of
context for the discussions below. Amongst the non-state armed groups, the
Irish Republican Armey (IRA) is the group that has moved most on demo-
bilisation. In August 2005, former Republican prisoner, Seana Walsh, read
out a statement on behalf of the IRA leadership which formally ordered the
end of the armed campaign, and stated that volunteers should ‘assist the
development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclu-
sively peaceful means’ and that they should not ‘engage in any other activ-
ities whatsoever’.8 The International Monitoring Commission9 has
repeatedly made reference to the ‘disbandment of [IRA] paramilitary struc-
tures’ (IMC, 2007a: 8).10 There was a suggestion from some dissident DUP
members (opposed to power-sharing with Sinn Féin) that the disbandment
of the IRA ruling Army Council should also be a pre-condition before the
re-establishment of the devolved administration in Northern Ireland in
2007.11 However, the fact that this did not appear to undo the DUP/Sinn
Féin negotiations on restoring devolution would suggest an implicit prag-
matism that some form of leadership structure is required in order to over-
see the transformation of such an organisation (IMC, 2007a: 26–7).
Amongst the Loyalist groupings there have been some parallel develop-
ments. In May 2007, former Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) prison com-
mander, Gusty Spence, announced that the UVF and the closely affiliated
RHC would ‘assume a non-military, civilianised, role’. Spence also indi-
cated the UVF/RHC would engage in a process of ‘transformation from a
military to a civilian organisation’.12 Even the Ulster Defence Association,
long considered the least disciplined of the Loyalist groupings and one of
those most embroiled in criminality, has indicated a desire on the part, at
least of some of its senior leadership, to engage in conflict transformation
(Gribbin et al., 2005; IMC, 2007b).13 In November 2007, the UDA
announced that it too was ‘standing down the Ulster Freedom Fighters’ (its
nom de guerre)— an announcement which was greeted with some public
scepticism.14 Notwithstanding such well justified caution with regard to the
UDA, and while elements of each of the paramilitary organisational struc-
ture remain in place, all of the main groupings would now appear to be on
some form of organisational transformation trajectory.
With regard to disarmament, the decommissioning of weapons has been par-
tial. Only the mainstream IRA has apparently fully decommissioned and this
process took almost nine years of parallel political developments, tortuous
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negotiations and complex oversight mechanisms (O’Kane, 2007). The 2007
UVF and RHC statement on their future also included a promise to put
weapons ‘beyond reach’. This has been translated as keeping them under the
direct control of the respective leadership of these organisations. That said, the
organisations have re-appointed another prominent former UVF prisoner, Billy
Hutchinson, as liaison with the International Decommissioning Body to explain
in detail how they are controlling access to these weapons.15 The Loyalist
Volunteer Force (LVF) publicly decommissioned a token amount of small arms
and munitions in December 1998. While the UDA have had meetings with the
decommissioning body, their statement of November 2007 indicated their
determination to retain their weaponry, albeit also placing them ‘beyond use’.16
On the part of the state, while demilitarisation (termed ‘security normalisation’)
was initially equally slow to respond to the changed security circumstances
(Rolston, 2007), this too has speeded up in recent years.17
It is the process of ex-prisoner and former combatant reintegration in
Northern Ireland which is arguably of most interest for this essay. As was
noted above, the linkage between ‘reintegration’ and political imprisonment
in Northern Ireland raises understandable hackles amongst politically moti-
vated former prisoners whose incarceration had been dominated by their
struggles against criminalisation (Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008). However,
even within the specialist criminological literature which relates explicitly
to ordinary prisoners, as is discussed elsewhere in this issue, reintegration is
a term replete with definitional wranglings and occasional heated scholarly
and policy debates (Braithwaite, 1989; Maruna and Immarigeon, 2004). In
particular, the assumption that much reintegration research focuses pre-
dominantly on the attitudes and behaviour of the released prisoner, rather
than the society to which he or she is returning, is a source of particular ire
for many criminologists working in this field (Maruna and LeBel, 2003).
Indeed such academic discomfiture appears to be shared with some ordi-
nary prisoners themselves. As Harris (2005) has argued with regard to such
individuals in Pennsylvania, many prisoners and ex-prisoners,
hold negative attitudes toward the concept of rehabilitation and correctional
treatment programs. In general, the distaste for such programs is linked to a
sense that these interventions involve things being ‘done to’ or ‘prescribed for’
passive recipients who are characterized as deficient, ineffectual, misguided,
untrustworthy, possibly dangerous, and almost certain to get into trouble again.
(2005: 318)
We have been particularly drawn to the genre of literature which is vari-
ously referred to as the ‘strengths based’ (Maruna and LeBel, 2003), ‘empow-
erment’ (Harris, 2005) or ‘good lives’ (Ward and Brown, 2004) approach to
reintegrative work. Briefly, this is a perspective which encompasses the
strengths or skills that former prisoners may bring to their own reintegration
as well as their potential contribution to their families or community (Ward
and Gannon, 2006; Ward and Maruna, 2007). Utilising the strengths
based approach, policy-makers and practitioners are encouraged to deal with
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prisoners and former prisoners as ‘subjects rather than objects’. The emphasis
here is upon supporting social capital related factors and processes (e.g.
employment, family relations, social networks) which promote desistance
from crime (see Farrall, 2002, 2004). From this perspective, ex-prisoners
should be treated with respect (Duguid, 2000: 18). Within this framework,
there is an awareness of the importance of the fellowship and mutual support
from other former prisoners who have been through a similar experience of
incarceration and return to civilian lives (Burnett and Maruna, 2006). There
is also a fairly cold-eyed assessment of the importance of individual motiva-
tion and agency in intersecting with these broader structural processes in the
desistance process (Farrall and Bowling, 1999; McNeill and Whyte, 2007).
The broad thrust of much of the strengths based variant of reintegrative
literature resonates strongly with the experiences of politically motivated
prisoners in Northern Ireland. Accepting as a given their broad political
motivation, it well captures the ‘self-help’ approach of former prisoners who
have taken ownership over their own projects rather than assuming passive
roles of accepting individualistic forms of ‘treatment’ or ‘aid’ (Gormally
et al., 2007). It is precisely this privileging of agentic potential which char-
acterises the work of many individuals and groups of ex-prisoners who have
played such a crucial role in the transition out of conflict in the jurisdiction.
A second feature is also of relevance. Although arguably less developed in
the British literature, there is an emerging concurrent emphasis within con-
temporary reintegration studies (in the US in particular) upon the rights of
ex-prisoners as citizens in a democracy (e.g. Petersilia, 2003, esp. Ch. 6;
Uggen et al., 2005). In the United States ex-felons sometimes have basic
rights, such as the right to vote, removed, with 5 million people in total being
disenfranchised because of previous criminal convictions (Uggen and
Manza, 2002). Upon release, ex-prisoners are routinely denied access to a
wide variety of occupations including (in New York) barber shop owners,
boxers/wrestlers, commercial feed distributors and (in Florida) acupunctur-
ists, speech-language pathologists and cosmetologists (Samuels and
Mukamal, 2004; Uggen et al., 2006). Of course, imprisonment also dispro-
portionately affects certain communities in America. For example, the
Bureau of Justice estimates that 32 per cent of African American men and 17
per cent of Latinos born in 2001 will go to prison in their lives, compared to
6 per cent of white men (Bonczar, 2003). In short, a prison record may
become the apex of a process of legal, social, political and economic mar-
ginalisation of poor people of colour (Wheelock, 2005). In such a context, it
is little wonder that progressive criminologists have increasingly sought to
recast issues concerning desistance and recidivism in linking reintegration to
the ‘restorative of full citizenship rights’ (Uggen et al., 2006: 305).
In Northern Ireland too, politically motivated former prisoners have
also framed their social and economic marginalisation in terms of human
rights and equality. As we have detailed elsewhere (McEvoy et al., 2004),
Republican ex-prisoners in particular have been at the forefront of a range of
campaigns designed to locate their efforts to assert the rights of ex-prisoners
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as a continuance of their longstanding resistance to the criminalisation of
their political motivation (Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008). Former prisoners
have lodged legal challenges, lobbied for greater legislative protections for
ex-prisoners and maintained a constant pressure on bodies such as the
Human Rights Commission and Equality Commission to ensure that the
rights of their constituencies remained firmly on their respective agendas
(Gormally et al., 2007). Although litigation strategies have to date offered
mixed results,18 intense lobbying and political mobilisation by ex-prisoner
groups has resulted in non-binding government guidelines that employers and
other service providers should not take into account ‘conflict related’ convic-
tions.19 Under these guidelines, discrimination on the grounds of past politi-
cal offences is only permissible if the post is ‘manifestly incompatible’ with the
offence or offences committed. The onus of demonstrating incompatibility
rests with the employer. Any applicant affected by a negative decision has the
right of appeal to an independent body and ‘it is expected that only in very
exceptional circumstances that such grounds could be successfully invoked’
(OFMDFM, 2007: 5). There is also provision to have these guidelines placed
on a legally binding statutory footing within 18 months of their commence-
ment if it is apparent that the current voluntary code is not working. While it
is too early to determine their impact to date, the fact that they exist at all is
a significant achievement of a strategically astute and well marshalled
campaign directed by ex-prisoner groups themselves.
In sum, contemporary criminological studies of reintegration resonate with
the experience of ex-prisoners and ex-combatants in Northern Ireland in two
principal ways. First, the strengths based approach to reintegration speaks
directly to the agentic capacity of such individuals and groups. Second, and
related, the framing of the structural obstacles which impede reintegration as
a human rights issue mirrors exactly the campaigning efforts witnessed in
Northern Ireland. Both variants of criminological scholarship directly chal-
lenge the assumed passivity of ex-combatants which permeates much of the
DDR scholarship. In Northern Ireland, ex-prisoners have been central actors
not only in the efforts directed to assist in the ongoing processes of disarma-
ment, disbandment and reintegration, but also in the broader efforts to embed
the peace process more firmly in the communities most affected by violence. It
is of course these same communities from which violence would emerge first
if the process were to fail. The practicalities of their role in such peacemaking
efforts is examined through the prism of the different forms of leadership dis-
cussed below. These styles of leadership speak cumulatively to the potential of
such men and women as moral agents of conflict transformation.
Ex-combatants and ex-prisoners as leaders in conflict
transformation
Before discussing further the leadership claims of politically motivated former
prisoners, it is important to enter two caveats. First, we are not suggesting
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that all former prisoners are necessarily ‘leaders’ in the traditional sense. Of
course some Loyalist and Republican former prisoners have long since disen-
gaged from their respective movements to re-establish a ‘normal’ life for
themselves and their families (Coiste, 2003a; Gormally et al., 2007). Even
amongst those who, in different ways, have retained their allegiances, some
might baulk at the description of themselves as even having been ‘leaders’
rather than ‘foot soldiers’. However, the notion of leadership we are suggest-
ing is more subtle than that of individuals who ‘give orders’ and who are, in
turn, obeyed by others further down a hierarchical structure.20 Rather, what
we discern amongst some former prisoners is a more organic style of leader-
ship, wherein localised respect, legitimacy and authority is associated with
them either as a result of their past action and ‘sacrifices’ (such as jail time)
on behalf of ‘their’ community or because of their evident skills and abilities,
again which may have been developed during incarceration. From this per-
spective, former prisoners involved, for example, in community work and
community-based restorative justice programmes, or seeking to calm tensions
at interface areas, or in reconciliation or ‘nation building’ work, are all pro-
viding different forms of leadership in the transition from—and prevention
of—conflict.
Second, it is also important to stress again that we are not postulating
some form of naive eulogising of all of those who once took up arms.
Despite the impressively low recidivism rated discussed above, certainly the
high profile criminal activities of individuals such Johnny Adair (former
UDA activist) did little to inspire public confidence in the trustworthiness
of Loyalist prisoners, in particular, released under the Agreement. At an
organisational level, despite the progressive trajectories detailed above, all
of the main paramilitary organisations have been involved in varying forms
of political violence and criminality since the ceasefires. Those caveats
aside, we would argue that, as former Secretary of State Mo Mowlam
opined with regard to the integrity of the IRA ceasefire, judgements need to
be made ‘in the round’ (Mowlam, 2003). The tendency to fixate almost
exclusively upon individual acts of criminality and other violent acts in
some parts of the local media in particular has, in our view, obscured a
more sophisticated knowledge of former prisoners.
We believe that it is possible to determine at least three overlapping styles
of leadership demonstrated by former prisoners and ex-combatants in that
process of conflict transformation—political leadership, military leadership
and communal leadership.
Political leadership
There is a considerable literature on leadership in general and the notion of
political leadership in particular (e.g. Burns, 1978; Blondel, 1987; Gardner,
1995; Elcock, 2001; Gormley Heenan, 2007). Of particular interest for this
book is that work which focuses upon the ways that political leaders prepare,
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cajole and sometimes even bully their constituencies in national and interna-
tional peacemaking processes (Sheffer, 1993; Westlake, 2000). Much of this
also considers the intersection between agency and structure, the ways in
which individual actors transform themselves from armed actors to negotia-
tors, often as a result of changed political circumstances (McGarry, 1998)
At a general level, the political leadership provided by former prisoners
in Northern Ireland has been obvious. Most of those who negotiated the
Agreement from the Republican and Loyalist parties were former prisoners
who had been convicted of politically motivated offences committed during
the conflict (Mitchell, 2000). Indeed, many are quite candid in admitting
that the negotiation skills employed were actually learned in their dealings
with the prison regime when incarcerated (Sinnerton, 2003). In addition,
both sets of protagonists have demonstrated finely honed antennae as to the
potential for ‘stretching’ their political base and considerable dexterity at
overcoming seemingly insurmountable political difficulties.
Such skills have also been evidenced at the micro-level through various
community-based initiatives. In the working-class Republican and Loyalist
communities in which such peacemaking activities take place, former pris-
oners are largely regarded as having ‘done their bit’ on behalf of their com-
munities. While, as we discuss below, there are important differences
between the attitudes of the two communities, the ex-combatants involved
in community-based work do, on the whole, bring a considerable degree of
credibility, respect and legitimacy to such programmes. As one former
Republican prisoner commented:
Locally ex-prisoners are involved in every aspect of their communities.
Community restorative justice is an example where ex-prisoners are
involved—trying to provide an alternative form of response to anti-social
behaviour. Housing committees, community groups. I mean they are activists.
They went to jail for activism—a different type of activism, but they are pas-
sionate about righting wrong, about bringing about change for people in
these areas. And that type of culture is there still, despite people being
released. They are giving leadership to people in their areas and they are
leading by example, they are getting involved.
(Republican: workshop)
The community-based restorative justice programmes in Republican and
Loyalist areas are a useful illustration of the kind of leadership under discus-
sion. Since their inception, the presence of former prisoners in these pro-
grammes as managers, staff and volunteers has been a defining feature
(McEvoy and Mika, 2001, 2002). The programmes were established as direct
alternatives to paramilitary punishment violence and involved extensive dia-
logue with the IRA and UVF/RHC. Almost since their inception they have
received enormous national and international attention (Mika and McEvoy,
2001; Braithwate, 2002; McEvoy, 2003; Sullivan and Tifft, 2006). They were
the subject of a specific paper in the Northern Ireland peace negotiations, a
substantial discussion in the review of the Northern Ireland criminal justice
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system, and a number of high profile investigations by bodies such as the
International Monitoring Commission and the Northern Ireland Select
Committee. Despite intense ‘party politicking’ concerning these projects (par-
ticularly concerning the policing debate—see McEvoy and Eriksson, 2008),
the quality of their work has increasingly garnered significant plaudits.
In his independent evaluations of the projects in Republican and Loyalist
areas, Mika (2006) reports that in the eight sites which he evaluated between
1999 and 2005, the projects were involved in almost 500 documented cases
which, without their intervention, would almost certainly have led to a para-
military-led punishment attack. In 2004 the Justice Oversight Commissioner
Lord Clyde suggested that the projects were ‘engaged in valuable and effec-
tive work’ and that ‘they share a common intention and motivation to make
a positive and peaceful contribution to the welfare of the communities in
which they serve’ (JOC, 2004: 101). Similar views were recorded by the
International Monitoring Commission in its third report in 2004. Finally in
April 2007, the independent Criminal Justice Inspectorate for Northern
Ireland (CJINI) found that the project which works in Loyalist communities
(Northern Ireland Alternatives) had demonstrated a ‘high standard of profes-
sionalism and dedication’ and they found no evidence of undue paramilitary
influence on the programme or that it was a paramilitary front and ‘every
indication to the contrary’ (CJINI, 2007a: 4). With regard to the projects
operating in Republican areas, the CJINI found that ‘the work of the schemes
is lawful and that (though they are not without their critics) they make a pos-
itive contribution to the welfare of their communities. The police concur with
that view’ (CJINI, 2007b: 31). The Inspectorate went on to state with regard
to the volunteers on the schemes (many of whom are ex-combatants) that
‘Inspectors were astonished by the level of commitment shown by those inter-
viewed, and there could be no question about their motivation being to help
their communities, not in any sense to control them’ (CJNI 2007b: 32).
These restorative justice programmes are a useful example of the leader-
ship of former prisoners and ex-combatants at the grassroots level. The task
of persuading communities long used to relying on punishment violence to
‘deal with’ their policing problems, to adopt restorative justice and associ-
ated non-violent ways of dealing with crime and anti-social behaviour was
formidable (McEvoy and Mika, 2002). The former prisoners and ex-
combatants involved in this restorative justice work bring an enormous
amount of credibility, respect and legitimacy to the programmes which
might otherwise be dismissed as the work of ‘do gooders’. Individually a
number of the most prominent restorative justice activists are highly skilled
and charismatic practitioners, but it is also clear that over the years there
has been considerable ‘routinisation of charismatic leadership’ (Weber,
1948) institutionalised into the working practices of the organisations
(McEvoy and Eriksson, 2006). As well as their previous organisational and
prison experience, many have also been involved in other long-term and ded-
icated forms of community work. By working with, and aligning themselves in
a very public fashion to values of non-violence, human rights, inclusiveness,
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and respect and tolerance for differences, such former prisoners have
provided significant small ‘p’ political leadership in transforming commu-
nity attitudes to violence. In addition, and particularly within Republican
communities where it was considerably more politically sensitive, they also
provided leadership towards the building of relations between the state
agencies such as the Police and other aspects of the criminal justice system
from which communities have traditionally been estranged.
Military leadership
Within military studies generally, there is an increased recognition that the
notion of leadership is much more complex than giving orders through
rigid hierarchical structures and expecting them to be carried out
(Mathews, 2002). Certainly the more sophisticated literature on the ways
in which volunteer paramilitary organisations ‘think’ suggests that the
exercise of leadership in a process of change is much more likely to be
based on internal discourses, relationships, organisational cultures and
mythologies than simply instructions being issued from the upper echelons
and obeyed by the rank-and-file (Crenshaw, 1990; Irvin, 1999). That said,
once a paramilitary organisation engages in a process designed to end
armed conflict, the organisation must ultimately deliver on that objective.
The principal benchmark for judging military leadership in such transition
is therefore the capacity to maintain organisational integrity and the
related diminution or removal of political violence.
Since the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994, a clear disparity has emerged
with regard to cohesiveness between Republican and Loyalist groups. With
regard to Republicans, in broad terms, the IRA remained as a coherent and
well organised paramilitary group throughout the transition and largely
weathered the storm with regard to splits and schism.21 Even on the issue
of Republican acceptance of the Police Service of Northern Ireland—the
most emotive issue of recent years, and one of the most powerful gestures
of the entire process—Republican discipline appears to have held firm.
Their ‘management’ of the potential threat from dissidents has at times
been violent. One prominent dissident was killed by the mainstream IRA
and others have been beaten as tensions emerged between the groups.22
Although there have been sporadic threats against mainstream Republican
leadership including Martin McGuinness, such an attack would almost
inevitably be met with a violent response. It appears, as one senior journal-
ist has suggested, that regardless of the mainstream IRA’s trajectory towards
total dissolution ‘they [the dissidents]know there are lines that they cannot
cross’.23 In addition, the mainstream IRA appears to have continued to
recruit new members, engage in training and intelligence gathering up until
2006/7, even though the organisation’s trajectory towards complete
unarmed struggle was by then irreversible. When questioned about this
apparent paradox a senior Republican told one of the authors:
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Of course we continued to recruit, otherwise those same young people might
have joined up [with] the dissidents and that could have been disastrous.
Once we got them in, well we had to give them something to do, so a bit of
training, intelligence gathering, march stewarding or whatever was necessary
to keep people busy. At no time however were these actions a threat to the
peace process, quite the reverse in fact.24
With regard to levels of violence, members of the IRA have allegedly been
responsible for at least nine murders since their ceasefire was reinstated
(after a temporary suspension of 17 months) in July 1997. Although it is
difficult to discern accurately when murders were ‘sanctioned’ by the lead-
ership, several appear to have been unauthorised murders by individual and
former members of the IRA as a result of local disputes, some were suc-
cessful efforts to kill local drug dealers, one was a killing of a senior
Loyalist and a there were a number of ‘revenge’ attacks against former com-
rades who had become informers for the security forces.25 Levels of pun-
ishment violence against alleged anti-social offenders have waxed and
waned according to local community pressures, the broader political debate
on policing and the efforts of the local community-based restorative justice
(McEvoy and Mika, 2002; Mika, 2006; McEvoy and Eriksson, 2008). In
short, despite some high profile brutal killings and acts of violence, the mil-
itary leadership within the IRA appear to have broadly delivered on their
ceasefire promises and maintain the cessation of organised Republican
political violence across Northern Ireland (IMC, 2007b).
The exercise of military leadership by ex-combatants and ex-prisoners
within Loyalism is, if anything, more interesting. Loyalism has always been
a more fragmented and less organised bloc (Bruce, 2004; Hall, 2005). In the
post ceasefire period they became even more diffuse with feuds and fac-
tional splits occurring at a number of critical moments and resulting in the
emergence of a large regressive/criminal element. Discontented forces
within Loyalism, such as the splinter group the Loyalist Volunteer Force
have openly tried to undermine transformative Loyalism through champi-
oning a discourse that depicts peaceful transition as duplicitous (Gallaher
and Shirlow, 2006). Despite leadership support for peace-building from
both the UVF and the UDA, rank-and-file members of both groups have
openly flouted the ceasefire (Bruce, 2004). Support for the Agreement was
always nominal within UDA ranks and this was further complicated by the
lack of a coherent social or political wing to the UDA, as well as a distinctly
horizontal leadership structure (Gallaher and Shirlow, 2006). By the mid-
1990s, these divisions had crystallised into two broad pro-Agreement and
anti-Agreement camps. The LVF, formed around Billy Wright and other dis-
affected members of the UVF, advocated unreconstructed Loyalist ideals of
Protestant superiority, political and cultural allegiance to the Union, that
were to be operationalised through ethno-sectarian territoriality.
In 2000, these intra-loyalist tensions erupted in the Shankill area of West
Belfast, in a feud which was dismissed by the then Secretary of State for
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Northern Ireland, Peter Mandelson, as nothing more or less than squalid
murderous gang warfare (Henderson, 2000). The feud was considered as
the outplaying of a criminal turf war rather than an ideological split. The
journalist Jonathan Freedland argued that, ‘in true Monty Python style, no
one can name a doctrinal difference that separates Adair’s UFF from the
Ulster Volunteer Force which it hates so bloodily’ (Freedland, 2000). This
anarchic disintegration of Loyalism has also been described as ‘idiocy that
comes with a fragmented culture that has lost both memory and meaning’
(Howe, 2005), or as a movement which, self-defined as defensive and lack-
ing a clear ideological ‘vision’, fundamentally lacks the capacity to trans-
form itself (Alison, 2004: 453).
Since their ceasefire in 1994 (which was not formally suspended during
the period of the IRA’s temporary resumption of violence), loyalists have
been responsible for 89 deaths. Despite those killings, and the ‘mess’ within
Loyalist communities evidenced by such violence, we would argue that evi-
dence of military leadership is none the less discernable. Interestingly, more
than half (53.9%) of these killings were undertaken by, or against Loyalist
splinter groups, the LVF, ‘C’ Company (affiliated to Johnny Adair) and the
Red Hand Defenders (RHD). While 31 civilian Catholics were murdered,
almost half of the killings were by these splinter groups. Four Catholic civil-
ians were killed by the UVF, none of which was authorised at leadership
level. By way of comparison, in the previous decade around 80 per cent of
all Loyalist victims were civilian Catholics. While not wishing to minimise
the capacity of Loyalist groupings for sectarian violence, these figures speak
both to a significant decline in sectarian killings and to a broader struggle
going on within Loyalism as to its future. According to the PSNI (Police
Service on Northern Ireland), Loyalists were not responsible for any killings
between October 2005 and May 2007 (see Shirlow and Monaghan, 2006).
In short, despite a long history of indiscriminate sectarian attacks against
civilians and a well established proclivity to criminality amongst some of its
members, elements of the UVF in particular have demonstrated significant
leadership in the transition from violence. Certainly the actions of Johnny
Adair’s C Company and the LVF were viewed by the UVF as intended to
destabilise the emergence of a transitional and conflict transformation-driven
Loyalism. While neither of us would underestimate the UVF’s desire to
respond to a perceived threat to its prestige and authority (and indeed the
safety of some of its members), we have been persuaded by a number of sen-
ior UVF ex-combatants who have argued to us that they were literally
engaged in ‘fights to secure the peace process’. That experience suggests that
even in combatant organisations which are less obviously politicised and well
organised than the IRA, there is still the capacity for significant acts of mili-
tary leadership. The fact that such acts were largely driven by a relatively
small number of middle-aged ex-combatants and ex-prisoners is perhaps all
the more remarkable and should again be judged ‘in the round’. It is of course
those same leaders who were centrally involved in the process leading to the
announcement in May 2007 that the UVF were going ‘out of business’.
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In sum, the Northern Ireland peace process has required significant
military leadership amongst the paramilitary organisations. That leadership
has required such groups to retain significant organisational cohesiveness in
order to oversee the transition to peace. In effect, in both instances, the
respective leadership of both organisations have had to become ‘change
management teams’. Perhaps paradoxically, particularly with regard to the
UVF, those same leaders would argue that the peace process actually
required violence in order to counter the destabilising threat from dissident
organisations. Again, respected ex-prisoners and ex-combatants had to
deploy significant reserves of organisational capital to lead these military
transitions. Put simply, unless those who brought the peacemaking message
had such credibility amongst the militarists, it would not have been heeded.
Communal leadership
The third overlapping style of leadership provided by former combatants
and ex-prisoners is communal in nature. The issues of community building
and the attention paid to the needs of former combatants are strongly con-
nected (Auld et al., 1997; Babo-Soares, 2004; Verwimp and Verpoorten,
2004). Indeed the process of being involved in community development
work may also guard against elitist tendencies which are sometimes identi-
fied with those who have been involved directly in armed struggle (e.g.
Irvin, 1999). None the less, involvement by ex-combatants in strong and
independent community organisations—utilising their existing managerial
and political skills as well as demonstrating a willingness to learn new
ones—is an appropriately balanced organic relationship between such indi-
viduals and the communities from which they come.
As is noted above, both Republican and Loyalist former prisoners have
been involved in a range of campaigning and service delivery work for their
own constituencies and their families. In addition, in the working-class
areas most affected by violence in Belfast, Derry and other urban and rural
communities, ex-prisoners and ex-combatants are to be found in all walks
of life. In community organisations, housing associations, neighbourhood
regeneration projects, youth diversionary projects, community education
projects and many more types of organisation—one finds ex-prisoners
acting as managers, staff or volunteers across the spectrum of civic and
community life in Northern Ireland (Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008).
What is perhaps of most interest is the particular role played in local com-
munities by such individuals in issues directly linked to the conflict transfor-
mation process. In particular, such individuals have been at the forefront of
local debates within Loyalist and Republican communities on truth recovery
and ‘dealing with the past’ in Northern Ireland (Eolas Project, 2003; EPIC,
2004, 2005; McEvoy, 2008). Eolas (information in Irish) was established as
a network of grassroots individuals working in Republican communities
who had experience in working with victims, primarily of state and Loyalist
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violence, as well as former prisoners and other community and human rights
activists. Those involved were frustrated at the sporadic and uneven focus on
issues concerning ‘victims and political prisoners’ and related matters.
Ultimately they produced a Consultation Paper on Truth and Justice (Eolas
Project, 2003). That document draws upon some of the relevant interna-
tional experience of truth recovery, it acknowledges the need for greater
understanding of Unionist/Loyalist views and needs with regard to truth
recovery, and sets out a mission and a series of principles and values which
should guide any process of truth recovery. It also proposes three overlap-
ping ‘discussion models’ of how truth recovery might be achieved, each of
which with a strong investigative dimension (Eolas Project, 2003: 32).
A similar initiative was established within working-class Loyalist commu-
nities led primarily by UVF and Red Hand Commando former prisoners.
This initiative is the most significant to come from former Loyalist combat-
ants concerning the debate on truth recovery. A document emerged after two
days of discussion on Loyalist attitudes to truth recovery and the require-
ments of conflict transformation.26 In a similar fashion to the Eolas process,
it drew upon the international experiences of truth recovery in order to
frame the broad range of concerns with regard to truth recovery. Although
the document expresses considerable cynicism about the potential of truth
recovery, and expresses a strong inclination towards ‘drawing a line under
the past’, it does acknowledge the need to ‘get the truth out as we see it’ in
order to counter the demonisation of Loyalists and prevent the future teach-
ing of history as being too ‘one sided’. It concludes that, unless a clear
answer can be provided to the question ‘what are the benefits for Loyalism’,
a truth recovery process has little chance of success (EPIC, 2004: 11).
Outside their own immediate base, both Loyalist and Republican former
prisoners have played significant roles in other truth-focused civil society ini-
tiatives, such as Healing Through Remembering (2006) and participation in
events sponsored by the Glencree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation in Co.
Wicklow. Again, the prominence of former prisoners and ex-combatants
across such initiatives is particularly noteworthy. Given the central role that
individual members and paramilitary organisations would have to play in
any successful process of truth recovery, it is precisely the leadership capac-
ity of ex-combatants in terms of raising and engaging with a difficult debate
such as this which is likely to shape the views of those constituencies.
In both communities, as with political and military leadership, the notion
of credibility is the key attribute brought to the process of communal lead-
ership. As was discussed above, it was former prisoners and ex-combatants
who have been key agents in challenging cultures of violence in working-
class communities directed either inwards (e.g. at alleged anti-social offend-
ers) or outwards towards ‘the other side’. They have publicly advocated for,
and worked in, projects which utilise restorative justice as a response to
local crime or anti-social activity (McEvoy and Eriksson, 2006). They have
been involved in painstaking relationship building and coordinating with
other ex-combatants and community leaders on either side of the divide in
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order to calm sectarian tensions at interface areas or during contentious
marches (Jarman, 2002, 2004; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006). In this and
other work, the work of ex-prisoners represent genuine, measured and
practical efforts at transforming communal attitudes to violence in com-
munities where it has long been a default option. As one Loyalist former
prisoner argued to the authors:
If it was an ordinary member of the community, they might be accused of
cowardice for not engaging in conflict but they can’t very well say that to a
person who has lived that way before and came to the conclusion that there
is better ways to do things. They also can provide leadership by encouraging
people not to become involved in militarism and paramilitarism … In the
early days of the conflict those who became involved didn’t have the benefit
of people who had lived through a conflict to give them advice. Now younger
people who may be tempted to go down that road, have the luxury of having
someone who has lived the experience and drawn different conclusions.
(Loyalist: workshop)
Conclusion
Much of the work undertaken by former prisoners and ex-combatants in
Northern Ireland offers a direct challenge to the assumptions of passivity
which appear to underpin much of the academic and policy literature on
DDR. While the recidivism figures discussed above are indisputably
impressive, we would be the last to claim sainthood for each and every ex-
prisoner. None the less something significant has clearly been taking place
with regard to the contribution of ex-prisoners and ex-combatants to
Northern Ireland’s emergence from conflict. In seeking to understand that
process, we believe that the different styles of leadership postulated in this
article underline the capacity of ex-prisoners to exercise moral agency in a
process of conflict transformation.27 As Burns (1978: 20) has argued,
‘transforming leadership ultimately becomes moral in that it raises the level
of human conduct and ethical aspirations of both leader and led, and thus
has a transforming effect on both’. For some, to speak of moral agency on
the part of those who have been involved in violence may seem counter-
intuitive. To take such a view, however, is to conflate judgements concern-
ing the morality (or indeed lack of moral justification) for engaging in
extreme acts of political violence during a conflict with the potential for
moral acts in the subsequent processes of conflict transformation.
It is precisely because of their violent pasts that former prisoners and
ex-combatants are ideally placed to provide such agency in moving out of
conflict. Having fought ‘on behalf of’ their respective communities, they
bring significant authority in delivering a peacemaking message. For many
of those we interviewed who have both inflicted and been on the receiving
end of extreme violence, it appears to hold little allure. Their rejection of
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the efficacy of violence as a strategy is itself a powerful exercise in political,
military and communal leadership.
Finally, we would argue that the lessons regarding the role of ex-
combatants and former prisoners in the Northern Ireland peace process are
of relevance not just in transitional societies. There is a role for ex-prison-
ers in making peace in other types of conflict which permeate many ‘settled’
societies (see e.g. Cressey, 1965). Thus recovering addicts have acted as
‘wounded healers’ helping others to overcome drug addiction, lobbying for
reform of drug laws and mediated drug related disputes in local communi-
ties in American cities (Brown, 1991; White, 2001). Also in the United
States, ex-gang members have been prominent in the ‘gang peace move-
ment’ and wider community development efforts to improve the lot of local
citizens in neighbourhoods where gang violence is an inter-generational fact
of life (Hayden, 2004; Maruna, 2007). More recently, in increasingly
thoughtful discussions on how to distinguish between radical politics and
violent extremism in British Muslim communities (Briggs et al., 2006),
spaces are being created for the involvement of former jihadists in commu-
nity and education programmes targeted at Muslim youth.
In all of these contexts, the value added of ex-prisoners is often more
than their capacity to deliver services. Rather, it is an ability to deploy
their prison time or their previous experience of conflict and violence in
the community as a resource which establishes credibility with ‘hard to
reach’ groups. Such experiences often facilitate a better understanding of
the large and small ‘p’ politics within which such communities operate as
well as a more nuanced understanding of the causes and consequences of
violence. These skills and experiences should be recognised, encouraged
and harnessed in any society seeking to resolve conflict. Deploying people
who get violence to do peacemaking work in such contexts is just good
sense.
Notes
1. For a detailed discussion on the definitional wrangles concerning political
prisoners in Northern Ireland and elsewhere see McEvoy et al., 2007.
2. See http://www.niprisonservice.gov.uk/index.cfm/area/information/page/
earlyrelease. Last accessed 22 February 2008.
3. http://www.niprisonservice.gov.uk/index.cfm/area/information/page/early
release. Last accessed 22 February 2008.
4. This is particularly the case when one considers the significant historical over-
lap amongst Loyalist prisoners in particular between individuals with a
record from ‘ordinary’ criminal convictions including drugs related offences
as well as politically motivated offences. Republican organisations, particu-
larly the IRA, have historically had much fewer prisoners who had also been
convicted of non-political offences (see Bruce, 1992; Stevenson, 1997).
5. Previously known as the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust (NIVT).
McEvoy & Shirlow—Re-imagining DDR 49
 at Queens University on June 21, 2013tcr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
6. The one notable exception was the appointment of Mike Ritchie as
Director of Coiste, the umbrella organisation for mainstream IRA ex-pris-
oners. From a Scottish Christian socialist background, Ritchie is a vastly
experienced human rights and voluntary sector activist who had previously
worked for a range of organisations including NIACRO and the Committee
on the Administration of Justice.
7. For an interesting discussion on the Colombian national experience see
Diaz (2008).
8. Video clip available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/
4724599.stm
9. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning was estab-
lished to oversee the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons in Ireland as
part of the peace process. Its objectives are to facilitate the decommissioning
of firearms, ammunition and explosives, by: consulting with the two govern-
ments, the participants in the ongoing negotiations in Northern Ireland, and
other relevant groups, devising and presenting to the governments a set of
proposals on how to achieve decommissioning, facilitating the process by
observing, monitoring and verifying decommissioning, and receiving and
auditing arms and reporting periodically on progress.
10. The IMC is a highly controversial organisation in Northern Ireland. Under
pressure from Unionists in particular, it was established by the British and
Irish governments in 2004 to monitor the activities of paramilitary organi-
sations, security normalisation and ‘the activities of Assembly Parties’. Its
members are a former leader of the moderate unionist Alliance Party of
Northern Ireland, a former Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, a former Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan
Police Service and a former Director General of the Department of Justice
in Dublin. Sinn Féin lodged an unsuccessful challenge to the legality of the
commission wherein they claimed, inter alia, that it was biased and failed
to offer any evidence to support its conclusions. The IMC is regularly lam-
basted for its uncritical reliance upon and publicising of security force brief-
ings, unsourced intelligence information and ‘rumours’ by nationalist,
Republican, Loyalist and other seasoned commentators on Northern
Ireland. See e.g. D. Morrison (2004) ‘IMC Land’, Andersontown News 5
May; ‘Progressive Unionist Party Rebuttal of the First IMC Report’, The
Blanket, April 2004; ‘IMC Needs to Make Amends’, Editorial, Irish News,
27 April 2004.
11. ‘DUP Rocked By Dissension’, Sunday Tribune 3 December 2006.
12. ‘UVF Statement in Full’, 3 May 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_
ireland/6618365.stm
13. The British Government provided funding of £1.2 million to assist in this
process. In August 2007, following the return of a locally devolved
Asssembly to Stormont, SDLP minister Margaret Ritchie announced her
intention to suspend that support previously authorised by direct rule min-
isters unless she could see ‘evidence that the UDA has moved irreversibly
away from criminality and violence to positive and lawful community
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transformation’. In October 2007, having failed to be so persuaded, she
issued instructions for that funding to be terminated, a decision which is
currently subject to judicial review. See ‘Conflict Transformation
Initiative’—statement by Minister Margaret Ritchie 10 August 2007,
Department of Social Development; ‘Statement by Margaret Ritchie MLA,
Minister for Social Development to the Northern Ireland Assembly on the
Future of the Conflict Transformation Initiative’ 16 October 2007,
http://www.dsdni.gov.uk/index/publications/ministers_speeches/conflict-
transformation-initiative.htm
14. ‘UDA: A Farewell to Arms?’, Fortnight January 2008; ‘UDA Stands Down
Military Wing to Cautious Welcome’, The Irish Times 12 November 2008.
15. ‘UVF meets Decommissioning Body’, 3 May 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/6618475.stm. Hutchinson, who had served
in this liaison role previously between 1997 and 2003 (before contacts were
suspended by the UVF) was accompanied at this meeting by a number of
individuals identified as ‘senior UVF leaders’.
16. ‘Ninety nine percent of people who we represent in the loyalist community
won’t hear tell of decommissioning. They’re not the UDA’s guns. They’re
the people’s guns, and the people don’t want to give them up because they
don’t trust people yet’, UDA leader Jackie McDonald quoted in ‘So Much
was said Yesterday about the End of Conflict ... But the Guns are Still
There’, Belfast Telegraph 12 November 2007.
17. For example, the number of army observation towers was reduced to just
two sites by January 2007 and, overall, army bases have been reduced from
almost 100 at the height of the conflict to 10 by late 2007. A permanent gar-
rison is currently envisaged of not more than 5000 troops, compared to over
10,000 at the time of the ceasefire declarations (IMC, 2007a, 2007b).
18. In Re McComb [2003] NIQB 47 the now Lord Chief Justice Sir Brian Kerr
found in favour of a former Republican prisoner who had been refused a
taxi license on the basis of his previous convictions. McComb had been
released early under the Good Friday Agreement. Mr McComb’s lawyers
successfully relied upon the commitment to reintegration in the Agreement
to argue that a person released early under the Northern Ireland Sentences
Act was, by definition, deemed no longer to represent a danger to the pub-
lic. Mr Justice Kerr concurred.
Less encouraging for ex-prisoners is the decision in a 2007 Fair
Employment Tribunal. In that case, which concerned two prisoners who
had not been released early under the Agreement, the Tribunal found that
the two former IRA prisoners (John McConkey and Jervis Marks) had not
been ‘unlawfully discriminated’ against by the Simon homeless charity
because of their ‘political opinions’ (i.e. previous support for political vio-
lence). While discrimination on the grounds of political opinion is unlaw-
ful under the Fair Employment and Treatment Northern Ireland Order
(1998), political opinion is expressly defined in Article 2 (4) as not includ-
ing ‘an opinion which consists of or includes approval or acceptance of the
use of violence for political ends connected with the affairs of Northern
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Ireland’. The Tribunal accepted that both men no longer support the use
of violence and dismissed their cases ‘not without some reluctance’. But the
Tribunal also held that the ‘clear wording’ of the relevant Article required
them to find against the two former prisoners. One source of comfort to
former prisoners was that the tribunal did call for the law to be amended
because of the ‘changed environment in Northern Ireland’—noting that
‘there may be good reasons to consider appropriate amendments to the
said article, or even its repeal, to reflect those changed circumstances’.
That determination was recently upheld by the Northern Ireland Court
of Appeal and an appeal to the House of Lords is being considered. See
McConkey vs Simon Commnity NI CASE REF:00452/00FET, January
2007.
19. Conflict-related convictions of ‘politically motivated’ former prisoners, or
their membership of any organisation, should not generally be taken into
account [in accessing employment, facilities, goods or services] provided
that the act to which the conviction relates, or the membership, predates the
Agreement. Only if the conviction, or membership, is materially relevant to
the employment, facility, goods or service applied for, should this general
rule not apply.
(OFMDFM, 2007: 4)
20. We are persuaded by the notion of leadership developed by former US
Army War College Instructor Colonel Christopher Paparone:
Leadership is holistic. Leadership means leading laterally or collaboratively,
and not just from upper echelons. Leadership entails leading the people, the
structure, the process … Leadership is symbolic. Leadership is about the
influence of meanings and interpretations that important constituencies
give to the organisation’s function.
(2004: 9)
21. The two main dissident groupings are the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA.
The former was formed in 1986 (in opposition to Sinn Féin’s recognition of
the Irish parliament Dáil Eireann. It is not thought to have been responsible
for any killings of police or army since its inception and, after further inter-
nal schisms, is not a significant threat to the peace process (IMC, 2007a). The
Real IRA was formed in 1997 as a breakaway from the mainstream IRA. It
was responsible for the Omagh bombing in 1998 which killed 29 people and
an unborn child. While there have been some recent attacks which have
injured police officers, no security force members have yet been killed. They
were recently described by the PSNI Chief Constable as ‘inept but dangerous’.
Both organisations have been successfully infiltrated by the security forces on
both sides of the border. In addition, both are hampered by a lack of techni-
cal capacity, minimal community support, lack of political prowess, and have
been subject to sustained pressure from within the broader Republican fam-
ily (Tonge, 2005). See also IMC, 2007a and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
northern_ireland/7229537.stm (accessed 8 February 2008).
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22. S. Breen (2000) ‘Feud Fears Grow as IRA Tensions Rise’, Irish Times 16
October.
23. See B. Rowan (2008) ‘Dissident Threats Have Little Impact’, Belfast
Telegraph 8 February.
24. Interview with McEvoy, 12 December 12 2006.
25. Based upon analysis of the data on conflict-related deaths by Shirlow and
Monaghan (2006).
26. In it the authors write that:
This consultation document is an attempt to provide opportunities for our
constituencies to begin debating the issues around truth recovery. We
acknowledge that people may experience this document as being inward
looking and self reflective. It is. It needs to be. It has to reflect the reality of
where our constituency is in its current process of conflict transformation.
Our intent is not to alienate others: our intent is to encourage honest and
challenging thinking with a constituency and to allow others to respond
critically to that thinking.
(EPIC, 2004: 3)
27. For a discussion on the philosophical, psychological and practical meaning
of moral agency see, e.g., Schmidtz, 1995; Deigh, 1996; Arpaly, 2003.
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